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a b s t r a c t
UK NHS contracts mediate the relationship between dental and medical practitioners as independent
contractors, and the state which reimburses them for their services to patients. There have been suc-
cessive revisions of dental and medical contracts since the 1990s alongside a change in the levels of
professional dominance and accountability. Unintended consequences of the 2006 dental contract have
led to plans for further reform. We set out to identify the factors which facilitate and hinder the use of
contracts in this area. Previous reviews of theory have been narrative, and based on macro-theory arising
from various disciplines such as economics, sociology and political science. This paper presents a sys-
tematic review and aggregative synthesis of the theories of contracting for publicly funded health care. A
logic map conveys internal pathways linking competition for contracts to opportunism. We identify that
whilst practitioners’ responses to contract rules is a result of micro-level bargaining clarifying patients’
and providers’ interests, responses are also inﬂuenced by relationships with commissioners and wider
personal, professional and political networks.
 2014 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-SA
license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/3.0/).
Introduction
Ever since the establishment of the NHS in 1948, both medical
and dental practitioners have worked as self-employed contractors
whilst being remunerated by various fees and/or allowances paid
from the general tax fund (Wynes & Baines, 1998). Consequently
both types of practitioners have developed commercial and
entrepreneurial as well as professional identities; although their
relationship with the NHS has meant that they are distinct from
private limited companies and thus straddle public and private
spheres (McDonald, 2009). Over recent decades however, as NHS
health reform has moved to adopt market principles where com-
mercial contracts are awarded to competing providers, this has
substantially reduced the degree of professional control held by
practitioners over the range and provision of primary care services
which they provide (Pollock, Price, Viebrook, Miller, & Watt, 2007).
Recent research describes how both doctors (Waring & Bishop,
2013) and dentists (Harris & Holt, 2013) have actively resisted,
adapted or captured reforms to accord with their own view of the
world.
NHS contracts mediate the relationship between medical
(GMPs) and dental (GDPs) practitioners and the state. From the
establishment of the NHS in 1948 up until the 1990s, general
medical and dental contracts were centrally determined, and
whilst regularly adjusted to amend remuneration rates, they
remained broadly unchanged and were largely undemanding in
terms of performance monitoring. In 1990 a new contract was
imposed on both GMPs and GDPs. The 1990 GMP contract intro-
duced a handful of performance targets (McDonald, 2009), whilst
for dentists their contract demanded that they give fuller de-
scriptions of treatment to patients in treatment plans, use infor-
mation leaﬂets, and guaranteed rights of access to emergency care
(Harris & Holt, 2013). Revision of these contracts has been on-going
ever since: most signiﬁcantly with the introduction of locally
negotiated and monitored Personal Medical Service and Personal
Dental Service contracts in 1997; and in 2004 where new legisla-
tion effectively ended the monopoly of GMPs over the provision of
primary medical care to the NHS, resulting in an expansion of
market forces in primary health care (Pollock et al., 2007). For GDPs
a new contract in 2006 enforced a greater accountability to Primary
Care Trust (PCT) commissioners, although the contract was later
recognised as ﬂawed by the Health Select Committee in 2008
(House of Commons, 2008) because of unintended consequences.
Further contextual detail is given in the online Appendix and in
Table 1 online.
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Continual rounds of contract reform to address loopholes in the
contract are expensive not only in terms of transaction costs, but in
terms of the social capital between purchasers and providers, the
government and the profession. This runs counter to the principle
of managed competition which is focused on increasing efﬁciency
and lowering costs. Light (2001) however points out both the errors
and corrective mechanisms which occur in shaping contracts are
deﬁned by social context and institutional forces. He portrays
behavioural responses to contracts as neither rational nor irratio-
nal, but interactional and contingent. It follows therefore that
practitioners’ responses to contracts, often viewed merely as self-
interested opportunism, should be viewed within a wider context
of organisational resistance to institutional change. As policy
makers and the profession plan for a replacement dental contract to
be implemented in 2015, we set out to identify the factors which
facilitate and hinder the use of contracts to manage and strategi-
cally develop UKGeneral Dental Services (GDS), using a comparison
withmedical practice to highlight factors distinct to dental services.
This paper reports on a systematic review of health care contracting
theory which was undertaken as part of a wider research pro-
gramme funded by the National Institute of Health Research.
Study of health care contracting stands at a cross roads of several
disciplines: economics, organisational sociology, strategic man-
agement, socio-legal studies and political science. In some of these
disciplines the focus is on individual providers’ responses to in-
centives (economics), whilst in others (such as the sociological
disciplines) there is more of an institutional focus. Theory of health
care contracting has been described from a number of these per-
spectives, and has previously been reported as narrative reviews
focused at a macro-theory level, which is broad in scope (Ferlie &
McGivern, 2003). What is missing is some work which provides
integration across macro-theories, as well as the detail of lower
level theory and concepts which leads more readily to testable
hypotheses and empirical work.
Recent research synthesising public health theory and in-
terventions has adopted a ‘logic model’ approach which elucidates
the internal pathways of interventions (Baxter, Killoran, Kelly, &
Goyder, 2010). As with other complex policy interventions, in
implementing a health care contract, there are multi-factorial
outcomes, and the causal chain between the agent and the
outcome is neither short nor simple (Baxter et al., 2010). Under-
standing relationships between contextual factors, inputs, pro-
cesses and outcomes is however useful to produce a ‘roadmap’
which illustrates inﬂuential relationships and components from
inputs to outcomes. Conceptual models (logic models) are useful in
providing a structure for exploring these complex relationships.
Logic models originate from the ﬁeld of programme evaluation and
are typically diagrams or ﬂow charts that convey relationships
between contextual factors, inputs, processes and outcomes. In this
paper we identify and map the complex set of concepts and re-
lationships between concepts relevant to health care contracting.
The aim of our review was to produce an aggregative synthesis
using systematic review methods in order to map the internal
pathways concerned with the implementation of health care con-
tracts. The review was based on the research questions: what
theories have been developed to understand how contracts work in
the context of publicly funded health care; what major issues are
involved and how do these inﬂuence the process and outcome both
positively and negatively?
Method
An electronic search of the literature was undertaken usingWeb
of Science, Scopus and Medline databases (search details online).
The search was limited to journal articles published in English from
1980 onwards. Books or other types of reports were not included
because if the theory were signiﬁcant in the ﬁeld, this would be
cited and therefore identiﬁed in peer reviewed academic publica-
tions. We included papers concerned within the use of ‘managed
competition’ (even though the approach was developed within a
non-publicly funded health care system) where papers were either
a) completely theoretical and not embedded in a particular health
system context or b) a empirical paper set within a publicly funded
health care context (either in the UK or beyond). Health care was
deﬁned as the delivery of patient care by a clinically qualiﬁed
provider and hence articles concerned with the provision of
ancillary services such as cleaning were excluded.
Articles where theory could not be identiﬁed were also
excluded. In order to assess whether the article contained theory,
Kerlinger’s deﬁnition of a theory was applied: a theory is an
interrelated set of constructs, deﬁnitions and propositions that
presents a systematic view of phenomena by specifying relation-
ships between variables with the purpose of explaining natural
phenomena (Kerlinger, 1979). Three primary criteriawere therefore
set that had to be satisﬁed in order for the material to be identiﬁed
as a theory. Thesewidely recognised criteria were that a) constructs
had to be identiﬁed, b) relationships among constructs had to be
speciﬁed and c) these relationships had to be falsiﬁable (testable),
(Doty & Glick, 1994). Although there is some debate as to whether
typologies are theories or just simple classiﬁcation systems, articles
containing typologies were included provided these three features
of a theory outlined were met.
The electronic search identiﬁed 1519 titles which were then
screened independently by two researchers (SM, JG) for inclusion.
Where there was disagreement, the abstract was obtained. The
resulting 311 abstracts were then also screened by two researchers
(RH, SM). Of the 131 papers remaining, a further 49 papers were
excluded on reading (RH, SM, JG). The 82 included papers were
then grouped according to macro-theory. For each paper constructs
and relationships between constructs were identiﬁed. Papers out-
lining the same theory were grouped together using a thematic
approach rather than a check-list, and papers organised according
to a hierarchy of theory types (macro-theory andmid-level theory).
In some cases mid-level theory could be associated with more than
one macro theory, but was attributed to one only, for clarity. We
have not also distinguished between mid-level theory and micro-
theory because a range of levels of abstractions exists between
the two which makes making reliable distinctions difﬁcult. After
cataloguing theories, concepts and relationships, a synthesis was
produced by drawing of a logicmodel to summarise themain foci of
interest and linkages between these concepts.
Results
We identiﬁed ﬁve macro-theories, and organised mid-level
theory under these themes. Details of mid-level theory with sour-
ces are available in the supporting material online. In these online
tables the 80 lower level concepts identiﬁed in each theory are
outlined in bold print. The main features of each macro-theory are
summarised brieﬂy below.
Macro-theories of contracting
1) Managed competition enhances efﬁciency, quality and con-
sumer responsiveness
The theory of ‘managed’ competition refers to the employment
of competition to promote efﬁciency and cost control, but with
constraints employed by government or purchasers in such a way
as to allow other health systems objectives to also be achieved such
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as quality, equity and responsiveness of services to consumers
(Enthoven, 1985). A range of economic theories have been gener-
ated which outline the relationship between competition between
providers and the cost, price and quality of health care services
(Table 2 online).
2) The PrincipaleAgent model
The PrincipaleAgent model describes the relationship between
the principal who delegates an action to a single agent in a contract
(Jensen & Meckling, 1976). The principal’s problem is ensuring that
the agent acts in the principal’s interest, overcoming any different
or conﬂicting interests. This is based on assumptions that agents
have more information than principals and that human agents al-
ways rationally evaluate and exploit situations in order tomaximise
personal gain.Where one party exploits contract loopholes because
of the limitation in the speciﬁcity of contract terms, this is termed
opportunism (Williamson, 1975). A range of mid-level economic
theories exist which identify which contract type is optimal to
manage situations of asymmetric information and stochastic pa-
tient demand, in order to minimise the scope for opportunism
(Table 3 online).
3) Transaction Cost Economic theory
Transaction Cost Economics (TCE) argues that there are behav-
ioural and informational factors as well as characteristics of the
product which affect the level of transaction costs (Williamson,
1979). The issue central to TCE is whether it is more ‘efﬁcient’ for
transactions to proceed through the market or to be integrated
within a hierarchical organisation (Ferlie, 1992). TCE identiﬁes the
circumstances where transaction costs may outweigh any cost
savings generated from using an internal market approach (Table 4
online).
4) Relational contracts
MacNeil (1974) distinguishes between classical, neoclassical and
relational models of contracts in contract law. The classical model
of the contract focuses on a single exchange between two parties.
The contract is considered complete i.e. all possible eventualities
are speciﬁed and there is full advance allocation of risk (Table 5
online). Since everything can be measured and recorded, oppor-
tunism is irrelevant. However, in many situations parties expect to
do business again and therefore there is an interest inmaintaining a
relationship. A contract which is relatively ﬂexible and which al-
lows for unpredicted outcomes to be resolved bymutual agreement
over the longer term is therefore more appropriate (the neo-
classical model).
The concept of neo-classical contracts has been further devel-
oped using sociological theory to recognise the importance of social
relations between the parties involved. How parties react during
negotiation and contract performance is signiﬁcantly inﬂuenced by
the history of social relations between the parties and the social
norms of trust and reciprocity (Ferlie, 1992). The relational model of
the contract identiﬁes social norms such as trust, solidarity and
reciprocity embedded in the contractual relationship as one means
of controlling opportunistic behaviour.
Whilst TCE suggests a one dimensional continuum of types of
organisation form along which ﬁrms may place themselves with
hierarchies (with centralised decision making and relatively little
autonomy at lower levels) at one end and markets at another;
relational theory offers a range of other possibilities such as stra-
tegic alliances and joint ventures (Ferlie & McGivern, 2003).
Organisational forms described as network or clans formed
through collaboration and inter-dependency, offer an alternative to
the two extremes and are relatively common. Professions such as
medicine display a strong network component which can shape the
relational market and constrain opportunistic behaviour.
5) Markets are institutionally as well as socially embedded
Social networks are increasingly considered important, not just
at the micro-level, but also at an institutional level (Ferlie, 1994).
Institutions such as the NHS and professions are thought to exert an
inﬂuence on healthcare markets by acting as ‘congealed social
networks’ (Ferlie, 1992); i.e. attitudes of the parties involved in the
contract are inﬂuenced not merely by the relationships in which
they are directly involved, but each party may have relationships
with a wider network of people, as well as indirect relationships
with professional bodies and the government (Table 6 online). All of
this history and experience has an impact on providers’ behaviour
in the more immediate relationship. This perspective draws
attention to the important inﬂuence on the contractual relationship
of the wider institutional context in which an individual pur-
chasereprovider relationship occurs (Ferlie, 1994). This differs from
TCE and PrincipaleAgent approaches which both conceptualise the
relationship between purchaser and provider as dyadic (Smith,
1996). Instead it recognises that a purchasereprovider relation-
ship is not adequately conceptualised as a single PrincipaleAgent
relationship, but is rather the product of a string of PrincipaleAgent
relationships extending from the health care system into the po-
litical arena. This view of contracting is informed by political sci-
ence, where the relationship between purchaser and provider is
pictured as akin to international relations between states. Here the
relationships are seen as ‘regimes’ which are based on ‘sets of
principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures around
which actors’ expectations converge’ (Smith, 1996).
The logic model
In aggregating concepts we identiﬁed highlighted ‘contracts’ as
the intervention input and ‘opportunism’ as an important inter-
mediate outcome. The concepts shown in Fig. 1 are a higher level
abstraction of 80 lower level concepts contained in the online
Tables. Fig. 1 shows important distal factors such as the role of
the state and the extent of societal trust in the provider institution
which have an impact on the system. In Fig. 1 we have highlighted
ten main concepts (represented as circles) and mapped links,
intervening lower level concepts and internal pathways. In Fig. 1
intended (efﬁciency, quality, consumer responsiveness) and unin-
tended (inequity, market segmentation) outcomes of contracting
are depicted as cloud shapes.
Discussion
Thework outlined here is primarily integrative, aiming to extend
our understanding of the complex relationships between concepts
involved in health care contracting. The directionality of some of the
causal relationships between concepts is tentative and further work
is needed to establish them.We recognise that the literature review
is not exhaustive, rather that it follows the principles of realist
analysis in that a point of theoretical saturation is reached in liter-
ature searching where further material does not add substantially
to ﬁndings (Pawson, Greenhalgh, Harvey, & Walshe, 2005).
The logic map (Fig. 1) lays bare elements that are key to inﬂu-
encing dental practice contracts. In Fig. 1 we suggest (in the shaded
symbols) contextual factors which are particularly pertinent to
dental practice, and distinguish dental from medical practices.
Some of these factors represent the type of the market (e.g.
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Fig. 1. Determinants of health care contracting outcomes in the NHS dental practice context.
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whether there are sufﬁcient numbers of providers in the area to
give rise to competition - departure of GDPs to the private sector
has left some areas of the UK under-served by public sector pro-
viders), and the likelihood that contracts will be contestable. An
important characteristic of dental markets is that they are highly
asset speciﬁc: with a signiﬁcant investment of premises and
equipment necessary for new entrants to the market and this raises
barriers to entry for smaller enterprises. The usual market response
to asset speciﬁcity is the negotiation of longer term contracts that
include risk-sharing arrangements between both purchaser and
provider (Howden-Chapman & Ashton, 1994) - a mechanismwhich
has never been used in the NHS dental context. Theory however
suggests that ownership is central to the normal workings of
markets and purchasereprovider sharing of capital assets acts as a
powerful motivator for agents (Roberts, 1993). Indeed, this is the
model used in general medical practice, where a rent reimburse-
ment scheme for GMPs owning medical practice premises (repre-
senting transaction speciﬁc assets) is in place, with (up until 2013)
this being tied to conditions restricting the balance of NHS/private
work carried out in that practice. For practitioners not owning
premises, purchasers effectively loan capital assets, although the
full implications of this type of ownership are far from clear
(Roberts, 1993).
The model also identiﬁes the role of the state in inﬂuencing
outcomes of contracting. The willingness of the state to allow
providers to fail in a competitive market may vary (they may be
more willing to let dental services fail than medical services
because dental services may be rated as a lower priority than many
other parts of the health care system). It also identiﬁes the role of
the media and the way the profession is portrayed, as a distal factor
inﬂuencing the extent to which practitioners and their profession
are trusted in wider society. The inﬂuence of the media can also
impact directly on political choices made by the state concerning
the management of the market via contracts.
Contract theory literature also tells us that using patients to seek
out services on the basis of quality can be a contract design tool
which has the potential to restrain opportunism. In theory con-
sumers are more willing to select dental services on the basis of
quality than medical services because consumers tend to be risk
averse when their condition is life-threatening. Since building
practice ‘goodwill’ has historically been integral to NHS dental
practice because of ﬁnancial responsibilities concerned with
ownership, being orientated towards consumer interests has al-
ways been part of the culture of the organisation (for more detail
see online Appendix). However since consumer demand can con-
ﬂict with what constitutes need, deﬁning quality as perceived by
patients in a publicly funded system subject to ﬁnancial constraints,
can be difﬁcult. Because practitioners have a more immediate
relationship with patient demand than do purchasers who attempt
to control the costs through contract rules, practitioners may
attempt to control resources indirectly through ‘gaming’ the sys-
tem. Morreim (1991) suggests that practitioners may be especially
inclined to game the system where contract rules seriously under-
serve patients’ needs. Thus Rees Jones (1995) portrays health care
contracting as a bargaining process which is formalised at a micro-
level, acting as a mechanism for clarifying tensions between pa-
tients’ needs and providers’ vested interests.
Rees Jones (1995) further suggests the micro-level bargaining
concerned with interpreting contract rules in the clinical setting is
set in a wider context of policy making which is a ‘network or
bargaining community’ between the government and the medical
profession. Our logic model recognises these wider inﬂuences as
mediated by personal, professional and political networks,
although the mechanics of whether and how micro-level bargai-
ning is related to macro-level bargaining is under-explored. Oliver
(1991) describes a typology of active organisational resistance to
institutional change which ranges from passive conformity,
through compromise (which includes balancing tactics accommo-
dating multiple constituent demands), to open challenge and
deﬁance. ‘Gaming’ may represent a form of compromise. Oliver’s
portrayal of a strategic choice between conformity and resistance to
institutional pressures may help us to understand why consider-
able variation between dentists is found in their response to
ﬁnancial incentives. There is currently an assumption that this is
mainly because of differences in the intrinsic motivation of prac-
titioners (Chalkley, Tilley, Young, Bonetti, & Clarkson, 2010).
Social capital can be deﬁned as ‘those expectations for action
that affect economic goals and goal-seeking behaviour of its
members’ (Portes & Sensenbrenner, 1993, p. 1323). This infers that a
member of a collectivity orients his/her behaviour to the ‘web of
social networks of the entire community’ (p. 1325). Personal,
professional and political networks can therefore shape the way
individual providers respond. Chan (1997) identiﬁes two mecha-
nisms whereby behaviour is shaped by networks: ﬁrstly in the
transmission of network norms and culture via the interconnec-
tedness of mutual contacts (which she suggests has an indirect
effect); and secondly in the diffusion of bad reputation arising from
dealings between parties with common ties where one party de-
fects (a more direct effect). Particular to the GDS contracting
context is the history of relations (at times difﬁcult) between the
UK dental profession and government. What we do not know is
how this history has inﬂuenced professional network norms of
behaviour in relation to contract rules.
Thus as we look to the future, and weigh the prospects of the
latest version of the NHS dental contract due to be implemented in
2015, being more ‘successful’ than the various iterations that have
gone before, theory suggests that we should not just focus on the
relevant merits of various contract currencies (fee-per-item, capi-
tation and the like), but on more general issues concerned with
institutional change, information asymmetry, mutual goals, shared
risk etc. In other words, contracting should be viewed as far from
merely a technical task, but as a complex intervention inﬂuenced
by a system of inter-related social networks, organisational forms,
labour markets, political policies and institutions (Bennet & Ferlie,
1996). The online Appendix provides a fuller analysis of factors
identiﬁed in the theory review along with implications for future
policy in this area.
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